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ABSTRACT
SEARCHING FOR THE FULCRUM: CAN ACCOUNTABLE CARE
ORGANIZATIONS LOWER SPENDING BY BALANCING SPECIALISTS-TOPRIMARY CARE PROVIDERS?
SEPTEMBER 2018
VISHAL ANAND SHETTY, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
M.S. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor David Chin
Background:
While value-based payment models emphasizing care coordination have been widely
implemented to improve quality and lower expenditures, supporting empirical evidence is
sparse. Our objective was to quantify the impact of specialist-to-primary care physician
involvement within accountable care organization (ACO) and its association with lower
spending.
Methods:
We conducted a retrospective cohort study of Medicare Shared Savings Program ACOs
from 2012-2016 using publicly available data provided by the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services at the ACO level. We examined the association between the
proportion of primary care services delivered by specialists versus other types of care
providers and ACO spending using a generalized estimating equation model.
Results:
The analytic dataset included 1381 MSSP-years. When compared to ACOs at the lowest
(<35%) and highest (>60) levels of providing primary care services through specialists,
ACOs who had 35% to 40% of primary care services delivered by specialists spent
$1,124 (95% CI, $358 to $1,891) and $969 (95% CI, $250 to $1,688) less per capita,
respectively. When stratified at varying levels of specialists providing primary care
services, having four years of experience in the Medicare Shared Savings Program was
consistently associated with lower spending when compared to having one to three years
of experience.
Conclusions and Relevance:
The optimal portion of specialists providing primary care services - to reduce spending was found to be 35% to 40%. These findings suggest that integrating specialists in to the
activities and objectives of MSSP ACOs could lead to lower spending and better
performance.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
As part of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) was authorized to create the Medicare Shared Savings
Program (MSSP) Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs). An ACO is a healthcare
payment and delivery model intended to incentivize a collection of healthcare providers
to cooperate, communication, and coordinate patient care across multiple clinical
settings.1 The premise behind the model is that by creating accountability and realigning
incentives for providers, ACOs can improve patient outcomes while lowering costs. For
each ACO participant, CMS establishes a financial benchmark based on the beneficiaries
in Medicare Parts A and B, who would have been assigned to the ACO in the three-year
period prior to the start of the ACO’s agreement period. If the expenditures for an ACO’s
beneficiaries are less than this benchmark in a given year, while fulfilling quality measure
objectives, the ACO receives a financial payment equal to a proportion of the savings. As
of April 2017, there were over 500 Medicare ACO contracts, providing care for nearly 10
million people.2
Expanding the influence of primary care was believed to provide the foundation
necessary to slow the growth of spending;3 thus, the putative success of the MSSP ACO
incentive structures depended primarily on strong leadership and expanding primary care
physicians’ (PCPs) role to promote care coordination.4, 5 Despite the promulgation of the
ACO payment model, studies have reported only modest improvements in lowering
expenditures and improving quality.6, 7
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As most health expenditures are attributed to a small proportion of patients with
complex clinical conditions,8 specialists directly responsible for the ACOs’ objectives
may play an important role in promoting coordination of care for these high-cost
patients.9 Additionally, specialists can serve to regulate the utilization of expensive
specialty services within the entire patient population. If aligned with the interests of the
ACO, specialists may be incented to provide specialty services only when clinically
necessary.10 While CMS does not require the inclusion of specialists within MSSP
ACOs,11 previous studies suggest that the integration of specialists may be beneficial for
ACO financial success,12,13 Given the short time period since the implementation of the
ACO model for Medicare,1 the current literature related to this topic is limited. While the
integration of specialists in ACOs may impact performance, empirical evidence is scarce.
A recent study examined the association between the degree to which an ACO was
primary care focused and spending and utilization rates.10 Investigators found that ACOs
with the least primary care focus (and higher specialty focus) had lower utilization rates,
but similar spending levels compared to ACOs with the most primary care focus.10 While
this study provides some insight into the effects of specialists within ACOs, it did not
examine ACO spending when PCP-Specialist involvement levels were more balanced.
We sought to examine the impact of PCP-to-specialist involvement on spending
across a range of specialist activity levels in MSSP ACOs. We also examined the
association between spending and a number of ACO characteristics across specialist
activity levels. We hypothesized that the lowest expenditures will be among ACOs
between the lowest and highest proportion of specialist activity. ACOs with the lowest
levels of specialist activity will lack the specialized clinical expertise to coordinate care
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or restrict utilization of specialty care for complex patients. Conversely, ACOs with
highest levels of specialty activity may be susceptible to unnecessary specialty services.
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CHAPTER 2
METHODS
Data Source
We used the CMS Shared Savings Program public use files to conduct our
analysis.14 These data represent ACO-level annual characteristics for the first four MSSP
ACO performance periods from April 2012 to December 2016.
Study Variables
Outcome and Primary Predictor
The outcome was total expenditures per assigned beneficiary person year in the
performance year, as defined by the Medicare Shared Savings Program specifications.15
The primary predictor was specialist activity, which we defined as the proportion of
primary care services provided by a specialist [see appendix].
Covariates
We used the proportion of male and Black/African American beneficiaries, and
beneficiaries aged 85 or older to account for ACO demographics. To account for the
severity-of-illness within ACO, we used the proportion of ESRD beneficiary personyears, disabled beneficiary person-years, dual-eligible person-years, and nondual-eligible
person-years, which were adjusted by corresponding HCC risk scores. ACO
characteristics (size, program experience in years, first year of participation) were
represented by 1) the total attributed beneficiary person-years, 2) years since the ACO
was first formed, 3) the calendar year started of the ACOs.
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Statistical Analysis
We calculated summary statistics for the outcome and our covariates by level of
specialist activity, categorized into seven groups. For ACOs that started in 2012/2013 and
2014, we examined trends in the proportion of participating physician specialists and
specialist activity until 2016.
We used a generalized estimating equation (GEE) model, clustering by ACO, to
estimate the association between specialist activity and ACO expenditures while
adjusting for ACO size and clinical risk-adjusted Medicare enrollment status groups.
Then, we examined the relationship between other covariates and spending by stratifying
on specialist activity group. Our primary variables of interest were gender, race, age
attributed beneficiary proportions, ACO years of experience, first participation year, and
ACO size. We also adjusted for the proportion of ESRD, disabled, dual-eligible, and nondual eligible person-years. Each proportion was dichotomized about the median while the
experience and calendar year started variables were categorized by year, with one year of
experience and the first period serving as referents, respectively. All statistical analysis
was conducted using R Version 3.3.1.
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CHAPTER 3
RESULTS
ACO Characteristics
The analytic dataset included 1381 MSSP-years (221, 334, 393, and 433 MSSP
ACOs for the second, third, and fourth performance periods respectively). Mean per
capita expenditures were lowest ($10,673) among ACOs who had 35% to 40% of their
primary care services provided by specialists and highest ($12,479) among ACOs who
had greater than 60% of their primary care services provided by specialists (Table 1). The
mean proportion of Black beneficiaries was lowest (14.3%) among ACOs with the least
specialist activity (< 35% primary care services provided by specialists), and was highest
(18.8%) among ACOs with high specialist activity (55% to 60% of primary care services
provided by specialists). A similar trend was found in ACO size; ACOs with the least
specialist activity tended to be the smallest (mean of 11,026 ACO beneficiary personyears), while ACOs with high specialist activity (55% to 60% of primary care services
provided by specialists) tended to be the largest (mean of 19,143 ACO beneficiary
person-years. Conversely, the mean proportion of disabled beneficiary person-years and
the mean proportion of dual eligible beneficiary person-years followed the opposite trend.
ACOs with the least specialist activity had the highest mean proportion of disabled
beneficiary person-years (20.8%) and mean proportion of dual eligible beneficiary
person-years (13.1%). ACOs with the most specialist activity (> 60% primary care
services provided by specialists) tended to have to lowest mean proportion of disabled
beneficiary person-years (10.9%) and mean proportion of dual eligible beneficiary
person-years (6.9%).
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For ACOs formed in 2012/2013, the proportion of specialists remained relatively
constant across their first three years in the MSSP (47.7% in 2012/2013, 47.4% in 2014,
44.9% in 2015), but dropped to 38.6% in the 2016 performance period (Figure 1).
Similarly, for ACOs formed in 2014, the proportion of specialists was 41.7% and 40.8%
in the 2014 and 2015 performance periods respectively, but dropped to 36.3% in the 2016
performance period. At the same time, specialist activity remained fairly constant across
performance periods for ACOs formed in 2012/2013 and ACOs formed in 2014.
Expenditure Estimates
After adjusting for ACO size, Medicare enrollment status, and severity-of-illness,
ACOs at the extrema of specialist activity (<30% and >60% of primary care services
provided by specialists) had the highest per capita expenditures when compared to the
ACOs in the referent (35% to 40% of primary care services provided by specialists).
When compared to the referent, ACOs with the lowest specialist activity spent $1,124
(95% CI, $358 to $1,891) more per capita, and ACOs with the highest specialist activity
spent $969 (95% CI, $250 to $1,688) more per capita (Table 2). Per capita expenditures
followed a consistent trend of incremental increase in levels after the referent (Figure 2).
The association between gender, age, and race, and per capita expenditures was
inconsistent across specialist activity levels (Table 3). A second year of experience was
associated with $1,119 to $2,759 lower expenditures across every level of specialist
activity in comparison to one year of experience. Four years of experience was associated
with 8.2% to 32.2% lower expenditures than two or three years of experience across all
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levels of specialist activity (except for ACOs with >60% of primary care services
provided by specialists).
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Table 1: Outcome and ACO characteristic means by proportion of primary care
services provided by a specialist (level of specialist activity)
Variable
Per capita
Expenditures
Experience
(Years)
Performance
Period
Started (1-4)
Proportion of
male
beneficiaries
Proportion of
beneficiaries
aged 85+
Proportion of
Black
beneficiaries
ACO
beneficiary
person-years
Proportion of
ESRD
person-years
Proportion of
Disabled
person-years
Proportion of
Dual personyears
Proportion of
Non-Dual
person-years

Proportion of Primary Care Services Provided by a Specialist
< 35% 35% - 40% 40% - 45% 45% - 50% 50% - 55% 55% - 60% > 60%
12286
10673
10773
10949
11287
12479
11019
2.0

2.0

2.1

2.1

1.9

2.2

2.1

1.9

1.8

1.7

1.7

1.7

1.5

1.5

42.8%

42.4%

42.3%

42.0%

41.8%

41.7%

42.1%

13.2%

12.3%

12.3%

12.2%

11.9%

12.8%

13.3%

14.3%

14.9%

18.2%

16.7%

17.6%

18.8%

17.3%

11026

14397

17794

18534

16778

19143

18133

1.1%

1.0%

1.0%

1.0%

1.0%

1.1%

1.1%

20.8%

18.2%

15.0%

13.3%

11.5%

11.1%

10.9%

13.1%

9.9%

9.6%

6.7%

6.1%

6.2%

6.9%

6.5%

70.8%

74.4%

79.0%

81.4%

81.6%

81.1%
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Figure 1: Trends in specialist proportion (of participating physicians) and specialist
activity for MSSP ACOs that formed in 2012/2013 and 2014
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Table 2: Per capita expenditure estimates by proportion of primary care services
provided by specialist (specialist activity), adjusted for ACO size, Medicare
enrollment, and severity of illness
Predictor
Specialist Activity
< 35%
35% - 40%
40% - 45% (ref.)
45% - 50%
50% - 55%
55 % - 60%
> 60%
ACO Size

Estimate

95% CI

p-value

1124.92
34.10
85.15
284.14
337.19
969.34
0.002

358.43, 1891.41
-325.89, 394.10
-277.16, 447.46
-175.05, 743.33
-258.83, 933.07
250.51, 1688.17
-0.006, 0.009

0.0040*
0.8527
0.6450
0.2252
0.2675
0.0082*
0.6105

Note: * indicates significance at alpha level = 0.05
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Figure 2: Per capita expenditure estimate trend by proportion of primary care
services provided by specialist (specialist activity)
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Table 3: Per capita expenditure estimates by ACO characteristics, stratified by each
specialist activity group and adjusted for Medicare enrollment status and severity of
illness

Variable
Experience
(Year)
Two
Three
Four
Year Started
2014
2015
2016
Proportion
male
beneficiaries >
median
Proportion
beneficiaries
age 85+ >
median
Proportion
Black
beneficiaries >
median
Total personyears (ACO
Size)

Proportion of Primary Care Services Provided by a Specialist
< 35% 35% - 40% 40% - 45% 45% - 50% 50% - 55% 55% - 60%

> 60%

-2759*
-3139*
-3748*

-1310*
-1179*
-1865*

-1230*
-1436*
-1931*

-1119*
-1306*
-1924*

-1175*
-1383*
-1506*

-1742*
-2003*
-2590*

-2355*
-2687*
-1537*

974
-2917*
-1302
-92

-1278*
-1077*
-1154*
-690*

-319
-991*
-1659*
-383

-560*
-1450*
-1432*
-390

-519
-404
-1904*
-475

870
-1284
-2810*
-1148.9*

-3489*
-1812
-1240
-296

-761

-64

-481*

514

-715*

441

-61

2278*

-80

-216

102

-35

-204

-1097

0.023

-0.005

0.003

0.005

0.007

0.025

-0.075

Note: * indicates significance at alpha level = 0.05
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CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION
During the first four performance years of the MSSP program, we found
expenditures were lowest when ACOs had 35% to 40% of their primary care services
provided by specialists while ACOs who provided primary care at the specialist activity
extrema (<30% and >60%) had the highest expenditures. This finding suggests that there
may be a balanced level of PCP-specialist involvement in ACOs which contributes to
reduced spending.
Our findings have several implications for the organization and structure of
ACOs. While 35% to 40% of primary care services being provided by a specialist may
not be a deliberate system design, it may suggest an organizational advantage when
ACOs attempt to curtail spending. A certain proportion of specialists contributing to care
coordination may lead to higher levels of engagement and better alignment of specialists
with the goals of the ACO. This may also reflect an ACO’s propensity for having the
provision of primary care services be multidisciplinary, which can be effective in the
management of chronic disease.16 Moreover, our findings reinforce the importance of
primary care physicians as the main conduit for care delivery in an ACO. Lower ACO
expenditures may depend on empowering primary care physicians to lead in delivering
and coordinating care, while creating ways to engage the right specialists based on
contextual factors such as patient needs and available resources.
Our observation of ACOs with two or more years of experience in the MSSP
having lower expenditures than ACOs in their first year is consistent with previous
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literature on similar risk-based contracting programs.17–19 This finding suggests that
several years may be required for ACOs to implement the clinical and structural
adjustments necessary for effective spending reduction. ACOs with four years of
experience consistently having the lowest expenditures across levels of specialist activity
may suggest that ACOs find ways to gradually reduce spending as they gain more
experience in the MSSP. However, there may be a selection bias in that ACOs that
persevere to the fourth program year are more capable of reducing spending when
compared to ACOs that drop out earlier.
The trend in the proportion of specialists decreasing during the 2016 performance
period may suggest a preemptive reaction by ACOs to changes in the calculation of the
ACO financial benchmarking. In June 2016, new MSSP rules were finalized which
incorporated regional FFS expenditures in to the calculation of an ACO’s benchmark.15
Under the historical spending calculation method, ACOs may be incented to limited
efforts to reduce spending and may even increase spending in certain years.20 The
changes to the benchmark definitions may have removed these incentives and may
thereby influence ACOs to drop specialists who were thought to be incurring high costs.
Given the growing number of patients across the United States receiving care
under the umbrella of an ACO (32 million as of the end of the first quarter of 2017),2 the
ACO model may contribute to reducing health care expenditures. While specialist
integration may be a vital piece for producing cost savings in ACOs, few incentives exist
for clinician engagement.12 Extrinsic factors may also limit the integration of
specialists.12,21 For example, ACOs located in rural areas may have physician shortages,
particularly among specialists.21 Smaller ACOs may be limited in their capacity to
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influence specialist practice patterns through control of primary care referrals.12
Nevertheless, the findings of this study could provide a basis for policymakers and ACO
organization leadership to take concrete steps toward integrating specialists, such as
adopting established clinical quality measures for specialists,22 or designing financial
penalty programs for specialist lacks of participation in ACOs.
Limitations
Our study has limitations. First, our primary predictor is intended to represent
specialist integration and engagement. However, this measure may not reflect some
important elements of specialist integration such as care coordination between specialists
and PCPs and a prioritization of “high-value” specialty services. Second, the
generalizability of these findings may be limited to MSSP ACOs. While the ACO model
is similar across different contexts and payers, the MSSP program has its own set of
structural conditions and requirements which may not apply to other types of ACOs.
Third, ACO ownership status and rurality are two key factors that we could not account
for in our analysis, which previous studies indicate may have an impact on our
association of interest.6, 21, 23
Conclusion
Since the creation of accountable care organizations, an emphasis has been placed
on primary care to drive the success of the model. We found ACOs who provide 35% to
40% of primary care services through specialists to have lower expenditures than ACOs
at any other level of specialist activity. Our findings provide initial evidence for the
benefit of integrating specialists in MSSP ACOs. Evaluations of utilization patterns of
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specialty services at the beneficiary level and coordination between PCPs and specialists
at the provider level will be important for understanding how ACOs across levels of
specialist activity differ in organizational behavior.
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APPENDIX
EXPLANATION OF PRIMARY PREDICTOR
The primary predictor used in this study was the proportion of primary care
services given by a specialist. This measure was calculated by dividing the total number
primary care services given by providers in an ACO (adjusted by person-years) by the
number of primary care services given by a specialist. A primary care service is defined
as an ambulatory evaluation and management (E&M) service determined by Healthcare
Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) codes 99201-99215, 99304-99350, G0402,
G0438, G0439, and by revenue center codes 0521, 0522, 0524, 0525 when submitted by
a federally qualified health center or rural health clinic.15 If the largest share of a
Medicare patient’s primary care services are provided by a physician who is a member of
an ACO, that patient will be retrospectively attributed to the ACO. Providers aligned with
ACOs are identified through tax identification numbers (TINs) and physician type is
identified through physician specialty codes. Providers who can give primary care
services include primary care physicians (internists, family medicine physicians,
geriatricians, and pediatricians), specialists, nurse practitioners, clinical nurse specialists,
and physician assistants, and services given at a Federally Qualified Health Center or
Rural Health Clinic.
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